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Ninth Circuit Upholds Cal. Low
Carbon Fuel Standard
Posted on October 1, 2013 by alanramo
By Prof. Alan Ramo and Tim O’Connor, 2nd year GGU law student
The Ninth Circuit’s decision September 18, 2013, reversing the
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union District Court preliminary
injunction, virtually vindicated the California Air Resources Board’s
Low Carbon Fuel Standard (“LCFS”). It was also a resounding
affirmation by the panel’s majority of California’s overall experiment
in addressing climate change on the state level.
The background of this case is discussed in this blog back on January
31, 2012. In discussing the District Court’s staying of California’s
pathbreaking program requiring fuels to have lower carbon intensity,
the blog authored by Luthien Niland noted the larger picture that the
“decision will significantly impact the ability of states to pass local
laws to reduce GHG emissions.” The blog further stated: “From an
environmental perspective, the best outcome should be the 9th
Circuit’s (and possibly higher courts’) affirmation of CARB’s
position that the LCFS is not discriminatory, but rather applies to all
ethanol producers equally. By upholding the LCFS, the court would
not only pave the way for California to meet its AB 32 goals, but also
encourage other states to pass similar laws.” Ms. Niland’s forecast
aptly states the nature and significance of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
This case involved the use of what is increasingly becoming the
disfavored dormant commerce clause, a negative constitutional
provision deemed implicit in Congress’s enumerated power to
regulate interstate commerce. The dormant commerce clause as
developed in case law prohibits a state’s protection of its own

economic interests at the expense of other states’ economic interests
in a manner that impedes interstate commerce. In general, it will be
unconstitutional for a state to give beneficial treatment to instate
economic entities at the expense of an outside economic interest.
California, for instance, can only impose greater costs on outside
entities if there is a nondiscriminatory reason to do so.
The Supreme Court’s most conservative members (originally
Rehnquist and now Thomas and Scalia) increasingly hate this
jurisprudence unless there is blatant facial discrimination as it is a
vague license to curb state’s rights. As Scalia has stated: “I would
therefore abandon the balancing approach in these negative
Commerce Clause cases . . . and leave essentially legislative
judgments to the Congress. . . . In my view, a state statute is invalid
under the Commerce Clause if, and only if, it accords discriminatory
treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not required to achieve a
lawful state purpose.”[1] Ironically, they are now the allies to
California’s innovative experiment in global warming regulation and
to a permissive decision from the Ninth Circuit so long as a the
regulation at issue is not discriminatory.
The California Air Resource Board (CARB) had adopted the LCFS as
transportation is the largest state source of greenhouse gas emissions.
In doing so, it analyzed fuels based not only on the fuel emissions
itself, but the emissions involved with manufacturing and transporting
the fuel, among other factors.[2] Ethanol, a prime example, burns
extremely clean from the back end of your ‘Ethanol Edition Jeep
Grand Cherokee.’ But the green house gasses pumped into the
atmosphere to manufacture and transport to you that clean burning
ethanol may be doing more damage than what the new fuel is saving
on the back end.
To address this issue, CARB places its regulations across the entire
lifecycle of the fuel, from the cornstalk to the pump. As it turned out,
Midwest ethanol manufactured using its local grid energy supply may
emit more greenhouse gases as that electricity has far more coal and
oil than the grid used by local California producers. Company A, who
may be in the Midwest, will use more energy (thus contributing more
green house gasses) to get their ethanol to the California pump than
Company B, who creates their ethanol in Modesto, CA.
This is where the dormant commerce clause comes in. Under this
body of law, a court can find regulations to be discriminatory in three
different ways: the facially discriminatory, the purposefully
discriminatory and the discriminatory in effect. In this case, the
District Court and now the Ninth Circuit have addressed just the facial
discrimination issue.
Now, California did not help its cause any by labeling different
ethanol products by the location where they were manufactured.
Calling some fuels “Midwest” and others “California” is suspicious,

let alone including the location of their manufacturing in the life cycle
analysis, and it led two federal judges, the District Court Judge and
the Ninth Circuit panel dissenter, Judge Mary H. Murguia, to consider
the LCFS facially discriminatory. It is no surprise then that the Rocky
Mountain Farmer’s Union, along with a handful of plaintiffs joining,
sued claiming CARB’s regulations were discriminatory. They
claimed they had been discriminated against because the Fuel
Standard set by CARB “discriminated against outofstate corn
ethanol by (1) differentiating between ethanol pathways based on
origin and (2) discriminat[ed] based on factors within the formula that
were “inextricably intertwined with origin.”[3]
Judge Ronald Gould on behalf of the Ninth Circuit majority
(including Judge Dorothy W. Nelson) basically went beyond the
appearance of the labels to evaluate the reasonableness or content
behind the label. As Professor Kathleen Morris, one of GGU’s
constitutional law professors, put it, Gould rejected “bootstrapping
semantics into a violation of the constitution.” Agreeing that CARB’s
original intentions of lowering all green house gasses was reasonable
and consistent with a legitimate state purpose of mitigating global
warming, Gould was willing to look past the geographical nature of
the label to determine if the label was meaningful based upon the
entire pathway of the fuel. The lower court in its commerce clause
analysis had excluded emissions related to the creation, formation,
and transportation of the fuel. All parties agreed that ethanol,
regardless of source, had “identical physical and chemical
properties.”[4] All ethanol is the same when it hits the car’s engine, so
the District Court believed that all ethanol, regardless of origin or
method of production, should be the treated the same.
The lower court was willing only to compare “production processes”
such as milling and refining, that were not linked to origin. As a result
it avoided the larger lifecycle analysis including transportation, and
efficiency and found facial discrimination. Then using a strict scrutiny
test, it found that California could avoid the discrimination and
compensate for the extra emissions by using a carbon tax, a less
discriminatory alternative.
But the Ninth Circuit majority saw location as “factors that contribute
to the actual [green house gas] emissions from every ethanol
pathway.”[5] The LCFS was not seen to be facially discriminatory
because the life cycle analysis does not care about where the fuel
comes from per se, but the energy used and the method and distance
involved with transportation.
Energy grid mixes are usually determined on the state level, as each
state in our energy system governs its own energy mix through public
utility commissions. While it might have been smarter for the ARB to
simply classify ethanol by the energy mixes of the grids utilized by
the manufacturers, it took the shortcut of labeling the energy mix by
its state (or in the case of Brazil, national) location. The location only

comes into play when it is traceable to the green house gasses that
will be released by using that location’s energy supply. If a producer
causes more GHG, it will have to pay more, no matter where it is
located. So long as CARB bases its regulations on these realworld
factors (which is the case here) it is nondiscriminatory.
The Plaintiffs in the case raised an interesting derivation of the facial
discrimination argument. On the one hand, CARB does allow a
Midwest manufacturer to seek an individual carbon rating based upon
its individual pathway. For example, if an ethanol manufacturer gets
off the grid and uses solar or wind power, its carbon rating can be
reduced. The Midwest designation is merely the default.
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While California thereby seems accommodating to outofstate
manufactures, a strategy the dissent believes California should have
used for all of its designations to avoid facial discrimination, the
Plaintiffs argued that this represented still another burden to outof
state manufacturers. They had to expend resources to avoid their
default, while a California manufacturer gets to coast on the lower
California carbon intensity figure.
As this may be a true benefit that an instate producer may see, it
reflects the “full costs of ethanol production, taking into account the
harms from GHG emissions.”[6] “The [dormant commerce clause]
does not require California to ignore the real differences in carbon
intensity among outofstate ethanol pathways.”[7] In essence, the
Court is saying it is reasonable for the state to assume a manufacturer
is using the local grid to carry out its greenhouse gas regulation unless
shown otherwise.
The Ninth Circuit panel majority goes beyond this analysis, however,
into a broader philosophical analysis of a state’s role in addressing
climate change. While professing not to take a position on our
industrial society’s role in causing climate change[8], the majority all
but endorses enthusiastically California’s attempt to address the
problem. Judge Gould speaks of California’s “tradition of
leadership”[9] and the “innovative, nondiscriminatory regulation to
impede global warming.”[10] It notes the danger to California: “With
its long coastlines vulnerable to rising waters, large population that
needs food and water, sizable deserts that can expand with sustained
increased heat, and vast forests that may become tinderboxes with too
little rain. California is uniquely vulnerable to the perils of global
warming.”[11] It notes the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007), recognizes the risks can be “local
threats.”[12] It bemoans plaintiffs using “archaic formalism” to block
action and reprises Justice Jackson’s quote that “the constitutional Bill
of Rights is not a suicide pact ” and states “nor is the dormant
commerce clause a blindfold.”[13]
If there is any doubt left about Judge Gould’s sentiments about global
warming, he summarizes:

“California should be encouraged to continue and to
expand its efforts to find a workable solution to lower
carbon emissions, or to slow their rise. If no such
solution is found, California residents and people
worldwide will suffer great harm.”[14]
The decision specifically allows California to “consider all factors
that cause those emissions when it assesses alternative fuels,”[15] and
carry out a life cycle analysis. It remands the case to determine
whether lurking behind the LCFS was a purpose or intent to
discriminate, and whether whatever burdens result to outofstate
manufacturers are not justified by its benefits under Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 39U.S. 137 (197), a test few if any observers believe the
state will fail.
Ms. Niland in the prior blog on this case ended with the classic quote
from Justice Brandeis affirming the role of the states as the labs to
“try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.” The panel majority explicitly adopted Justice Brandeis’
approach in its decision, noting “those experiments may often be
adopted by other states without Balkanizing the national market or by
the federal government without infringing on state power.”[16] Hint,
Hint.
[1] Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc. 486 US 888
(1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
[2] See Appendix II in the Ninth Circuit decision, Rocky Mt. Farmers
Union v. Corey, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19258, at 79 (9th Cir. Cal.
Sept. 18, 2013).
[3] Rocky Mountain Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1087
[4] Rocky Mountain Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1081
[5] Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19258, at
34 (9th Cir. Cal. Sept. 18, 2013)

[6] Id. at 42.
[7] Id. at 42.
[8] Id. at 11.
[9] Id. at 14.
[10] Id. at 70.
[11] Id. at 69.
[12] Id. at 69.

[13] Id. at 70.
[14] Id. at 70.
[15] Id. at 38.
[16] Id. at 31.
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